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Some empirical works from the nineties have shown the existence of
a negative relationship between inequality and growth. In this paper I
show that the ineﬃciency of the Public Sector due to agency problems
can be a new element that must be considered to explain the negative
empirical relationship between inequality and growth. Considering a neo-
Schumpeterian endogenous growth model, I envisage the relationship be-
tween rent-seeking bureaucracies and both the private market and political
authority. I show that the ineﬃciency of the Public Sector can contribute
to widening income inequality and reducing the per-capita output growth
rate because of the skills waste in oversight of rent-seeking bureaucracies.
Therefore bureaucratic quality can contribute to explaining the long-run
negative relationship between inequality and growth. I show that these
eﬀects operates mostly in developed countries, where human capital accu-
mulation and technological progress are fundamental engines for growth.
Moreover, I show that more costly oversight reduces the consume of each
existing product.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Is inequality harmful for growth? In their seminal paper Persson and Tabellini
(1994) answered positively to this question. Following this work, other empirical
analysis showed the existence of a negative relationship between inequality and
growth due to a variety of mechanisms and factors such as the redistributive
pressures of voters, social conﬂi c t s ,e x p r o p r i a t i o n ,a n dﬁnancial market imper-
fections.1 However, the existence of a negative relationship between inequality
and growth is not unanimously recognized in the literature.2 Although a recent
paper by Banerjee and Duﬂo (2003) does not come to a conclusive argument,
they maintain: ”...the conclusions of Forbes (2000) and Li and Zou (1998) are
not warranted: there is no evidence in the data that increase in inequality are
good for growth. In fact, the bulk of the evidence goes in the opposite direction.”
The aim of this work is to suggest a new theoretical channel through which
it is possible to explain the long-run negative relationship between inequality
and growth. In this paper I show how institutional quality - in the form of
bureaucratic quality3 - can contribute to explaining the negative relationship
between inequality and growth.
Endogenous growth literature has greatly spurred the study of the eﬀects of
public policy on economic growth.4 The role of good institutions - and there-
fore also of a high level of bureaucratic quality - has been emphasized in recent
years as key for development and growth eﬀectiveness. For example, it has been
argued that merely allocating public resources to the right goods and services
may not lead to desiderable outcomes if budget institutions are malfunctioning
(World Bank 1998). In fact, as Rajkumar and Swaroop (2002) write: ”well-
functioning public institutions are critical for translating public spending into
eﬀective services.”5 A very recent paper by Glaeser et al. (2004) shows that
1See Alesina and Rodrik (1994); Perotti (1996); Benhabib and Rustichini (1996); Benabou
(1996); Galor and Zeira (1993) Benarjee and Newman (1993).
2See Forbes (2000), Benhabib and Spiegel (1998), Li and Zou (1998), Barro (2000).
3Bureaucratic quality is part of the wider concept of institutional quality. Institutional
quality is measured in a variety of ways: Government stability, corruption, bureaucratic qual-
ity, civil liberties, law and order, Government repudiation of contracts, risk of expropriation,
rule of law, etc. I this paper I consider a wider concept of bureaucratic quality than the usual
one. In fact, in this theoretical framework bureaucratic quality also encompasses corruption
phenomena.
4Following the empirical works by Mauro (1995) and Knack and Keefer (1995), this body
of research has expanded to include the analysis of various distortions introduced by ineﬃcient
or corrupt bureaucracies.
5Rajkumar and Swaroop (2002) use corruption and bureaucratic quality as measures of
governance (these measures are taken from the Political Risk Services Group). The authors
empirically examine whether public health spending is more eﬀective in improving health
status in countries with good governance. Their results show that the link between public
health spending and child and infant mortality is negative, but the eﬃcacy of public spending
in lowering child and infant mortalities is positively related to the level of governance. In
countries rated very corrupt or rated to have a very ineﬀective bureaucracy, public health
spending at the margin will be ineﬃcacious. The observations are for two years (1990 and
1997) for two diﬀerent samples: the sample with child (under 5) mortality as dependent
variable (148 observations from 90 developed and developing countries), and the sample with
2commonly used measures of institutions do not reﬂect either constraints on Gov-
ernment or permanent feature of political landscape,6 and then cannot be used
to establish causality from institutions to growth. Moreover, the authors ﬁnd
empirical evidence showing that causality runs from growth to good institu-
tions: higher level of human capital and growth in income lead to institutional
improvements and democratization. I will argument later that the theoretical
results of this work are also compatible with these ﬁndings.
Several empirical works show that lack of bureaucratic quality harms the
growth performance of both developed and developing countries. Sarte (2001)
shows the existence of an inverse relationship between bureaucratic delays and
per-capita output growth rate.7 Lamsdorﬀ (2003, 2004) shows that corruption,
and therefore lack of bureaucratic quality, has a negative impact on productiv-
ity.8 Moreover Lambdsorﬀ (2004) shows that ”the crucial reason why corruption
has an adverse impact on productivity is related to accompanying low levels of
bureaucratic quality...This type of corruption is particularly relevant with cor-
rupt agents.”9
An important and interesting map has been developed recently tracing the
route through which bureaucratic quality aﬀects economic growth. A recent
paper by Sarte (2001) suggests that the adverse eﬀect a more ineﬃcient bu-
reaucracy has on economic growth depends not only on the interaction between
the bureaucracies themselves and the private market, but also on the political
authority’s interactions with its executive agencies. This means that the growth
eﬀects of Government spending are partially linked to the agency problem be-
infant mortality as dependent variable (169 observations from 98 developed and developing
countries).
6The authors ﬁnd that, in several deﬁnition of institutions, a key word is constraints on
government which, in addition, must be reasonably permanent or durable. Then in their
analysis Glaeser et al. (2004) ask if the current measures of institutions reﬂect constraints on
government, and permanent or durable features of the environment.
7Sarte (2001) uses an index of Bureaucratic Delays obtained from the Business Environ-
mental Risk Service (BERI), which is meant to capture the ”speed and the eﬃciency of the
civil service”. The same author maintains that ”the vague deﬁnition of the BERI indices
allows for multiple interpretations.”
8Lamsdorﬀ (2003, 2004) measures productivity as the ratio of GDP to the capital stock for
the period 1974-2000 for 69 developed and developing countries. Lamsdorﬀ (2003) writes: ”An
increase in corruption by one point on a scale from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt) lowers
productivity by 2 percent...A reduction of Tanzania’s level of corruption to that of United
Kingdom would increase productivity by 10 percent, leading to a 20 percent increase in the
GDP. Decomposing this impact reveals that bureaucratic quality is the crucial determinant...”.
Lamsdorﬀ (2004) comes to the same results.
9Other empirical analysis in this direction are Grigorian and Martinez (2001) who ﬁnd
evidence that a higher level of bureaucratic quality has a positive impact on industrial growth
through total factor productivity (the authors use a sample of 27 Asian and Latin American
countries containing data from 1982 to 1997). Rodrik (1997) ﬁnds that bureaucratic quality
aﬀects the long run growth of GDP per worker: better institutional quality - and therefore
also better bureaucratic quality - positively aﬀects total factor productivity growth (Rodrik,
1997 uses an index of institutional quality for eight East Asian countries: Indonesia, Japan,
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailandia, Taiwan, for the period 1960-1994. Tanzi
and Davoodi (1997) provide evidence that corruption actually increases public investment,
especially in unproductive projects, and squeezes public expenditure allocations for operations
and maintenance, thereby lowering the productivity of the public capital stock.
3tween political authority and its bureaucracy.10
Diﬀerently to Sarte (2001), I consider the interaction of the rent-seeking bu-
reaucracy with both the private market and the Government. In this paper I
focus on bureaucratic quality as a fundamental element for the economic per-
formance of a country. However, consideration of bureaucratic quality does not
mean excluding consideration of the important and widespread phenomena of
corruption. In fact, Lamsdorﬀ (2003, 2004) studies the empirical relationship
between corruption and productivity and he ﬁnds that (see Lamsdorﬀ 2003):
”Bureaucratic quality exerts a signiﬁcant impact...Once including bureaucratic
quality into the regressions, the inﬂuence exerted by corruption becomes in-
signiﬁcant. This suggest that the adverse impact of corruption on productivity
largely runs via its correlation with lack bureaucratic quality.” Therefore I can
use bureaucratic quality to encompass both rent-seeking and corruption phe-
nomena. As usual in literature I assume rent-seeking bureaucracies, that is the
bureaus act to maximize their discretionary budget and have better information
with respect to the Government about the costs and technology of the exist-
ing products.11 This implies that the eﬃciency of Government expenditures is
related to the need for some form of monitoring over the bureaucratic agencies.12
I consider the agency problem between the political authority and its bu-
reaucracy as incorporated in a neo-Schumpeterian endogenous growth model,
in which the fundamental engine of growth is tied to technological progress con-
ducted in the existing industry lines (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion
and Howitt, 1992-1998, etc.). I assume that the Government uses tax proceeds
levied on consumers to acquire a fraction of the existing industry lines.13 The
10Sarte (2001) refers to at least two lines of ongoing research which support this hypothesis:
Barro (1990) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1994, 1997).
11See Niskanen (1971, 1994) and Migué and Bélanger (1974). Sarte (2001) writes: ”public
goods and services do not originate from the central government directly, but rather from
a variety of agencies under its control. These bureaus are typically better informed than
political authority as to the technology they use to provide public services and, furthermore,
generally act in their self interest.”
12In the U.S.A. the existence of the Oﬃce Management Budget (OMB) and of the
General Accounting Oﬃce (GAO) testiﬁes that government uses some form of over-
sight agency to control bureaucratic endeavour. As we can read on the OMB web-site
(www.whitehouse/gov/omb/): ”OMB’s predominant mission is to assist the President in over-
seeing the preparation of the federal budget and to supervise its administration in Executive
Branch agencies. In helping to formulate the President’s spending plans, OMB evaluates the
eﬀectiveness of agency programs, policies, and procedures, assesses competing funding de-
mands among agencies, and sets funding priorities.” Moreover on the GAO web-site we can
read (www.gao.gov/): ”GAO examines the use of public funds, evaluates federal programs
and activities, and provides analyses, options, recommendations, and other assistance to help
the Congress make eﬀective oversight, policy, and funding decisions. In this context, GAO
works to continuously improve the economy, eﬃciency, and eﬀectiveness of the federal gov-
ernment...GAO is dedicated to good government through its commitment to the core values
of accountability, integrity, and reliability.” In 1997 Italy constituted Consip, a company be-
longing to the Ministry of Economics and Finance. Consip manages all the purchases of the
Public Sector and its fundamental target is to guarantee public expenditure eﬃciency and ra-
tionalization, the eﬃciency of bureaucracy and the quality of the goods and services provided
by the Public Sector. On the Consip website we can read that in 2003 ”Consip’s activity has
allowed a saving of over 90%” for the public sector purchases.
13I assume that this fraction is exogenously given. However, the results of the model hold
4price of each product is established by the rent-seeking bureaucracy, which has
an informational advantage over the Government and knows the quality of the
products. The price reﬂects the monopsonistic power exerted by the Govern-
ment over the monopolistic private ﬁrms (see Cozzi, 2003), and the rent-seeking
behavior of the bureaucracy. Moreover, the prices could reﬂect a corruption phe-
nomena of bureaus.14 A fraction of these goods and services is wasted by the
Government to monitor the bureaucracy, the remaining quantity is consumed
by the population.
In this environment the costs of monitoring the rent-seeking bureaucracies
are meant to identify the degree of technical and informational advantage the
bureaus have over the political authority: the bureaus have an informational
advantage on the technology used by private ﬁrms in producing existing goods
and services, and the Government tries to limit this informational gap by using
the oversight agencies. With this aim these oversight agencies must use skills
in order to at least mitigate the informational gap between the bureaus and
the Government. As Rajkumar and Swaroop (2002) write: ”Managing public
resources to promote development requires well-trained, skillful personnel...”.15
In this economic environment I show that the existence of rent-seeking bu-
reaucracies with an informational advantage with respect to the political author-
ity negatively aﬀects both the per-capita output growth rate of the economy and
inequality, widening the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers.16 In
fact, in economies with more costly oversight, the public sector absorbs more
and more skill resources in order to monitor the rent-seeking bureaucratic agen-
cies. The higher demand for skills resources raises the skill premium and wage
inequality. This, in turn, reduces the skill resources engaged in research ac-
tivity and thus reduces the innovation rate of the economy. Therefore, in this
framework, there exists a negative relationship between inequality and growth.
for any value of this fraction.
14In fact, since each bureau acts to maximize its budget, the manufacturing ﬁrm could
corrupt bureaucracy by rebating back them a fraction of the higher price obtained thanks to
a lower monopsonistic power exerted by bureau. This mechanism is not explicitly inserted in
the model, but it is absolutely compatible with both the theoretical framework and prediction
of the model.
15A sw ec a nr e a do nt h eO M Bw e b - s i t e :” O M Bs t a ﬀ are highly-motivated and well-trained
individuals. Over ninety percent of the staﬀ hold career, rather than political, appointments.
Over seventy percent of the staﬀ are professionals, most with graduate degrees in economics,
business and accounting, public administration and policy, law, engineering, and other dis-
ciplines...OMB’s work requires the following: sharp analytical and quantitative skills...” On
the GAO web-site we can read: ”Our employees are at the front line of congressional over-
sight, and our work depends on their knowledge, analyses, and specialized skills...More than
half of our staﬀ have doctoral or master’s degrees from leading universities in such areas as
public administration, public policy, law, business, computer science, accounting, economics,
and the social sciences.” Furthermore, also Consip’s workers are highly skilled, as we can
read on the Consip website: ”Consip is surely equivalent to an important know-how company,
that is with high knowledge intensity, in which the most important production factor is its
intellectual capital.” 72% of Consip’s workers have a Bachelors degree.
16S i n c ei nt h i sf r a m e w o r kt h ee n t i r ep u b l i cs e c t o ra n dﬁscal system (in the form of propor-
tional taxes for acquiring products, lump sum transfers to individuals, monitoring costs) is
highly related to skill accumulation and waste, I envisage skill premium as a proxy for the
wider concept of income inequality, at least for developed countries.
5Chong and Calderon (2000) ﬁnd that better institution quality - also in
the form of better bureaucratic quality - reduces income inequality in devel-
oped countries and worsens income inequality in developing countries.17 The
empirical analysis shows that lack of bureaucratic quality and corruption are
bad for growth performance in both developed and developing countries. At
the same time, the empirical study by Chong and Calderon (2000) shows that
bureaucratic quality only reduces income inequality in richer countries.
In this theoretical framework the negative eﬀect rent-seeking bureaucracy
has on income inequality and on per-capita output growth operates to a major
degree through skill waste. This process is more likely to happen in countries
with a high level of skill accumulation in which human capital accumulation,
technological progress, and R&D are the prime engines of economic growth,
such as developed countries.18 In such countries the existence of rent-seeking
bureaucracies and corrupt agents can produce a waste of skill resources by di-
verting them from productive activities toward unproductive ones, and therefore
negatively aﬀect income inequality and the per-capita output growth rate.19 I
argue that in developing countries, the same causal mechanism can be at work,
but it is a second-order problem for such countries. In fact, since R&D and
human capital accumulation in less developed countries are not as advanced
as in developed countries, the adverse eﬀect of lack bureaucratic quality on
income inequality and on output growth probably operates through other chan-
nels than the waste of skill resources. Moreover, in developing countries other
elements and causal mechanisms can play a role more important than lack of in-
stitutional quality in determining skill premium and per-capita output growth.
Then, the theoretical results of this work are also compatible with Glaeser et al.
(2004) empirical evidence. In fact, I show that human capital and technological
progress are the fundamental engines of economic growth for both developed
and developing countries, but lack of institutional quality can undermine the
growth performance of developed countries by wasting skill resources which are
t h ec o r eo fe c o n o m i cp r o s p e r i t y .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3
17Chong and Calderon (2000) use two sets of institutional quality measure from the Inter-
national Country Risk Guide (ICGR) and Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI).
These data sets contain measure on corruption, quality of bureaucracy, law and order, risk of
expropriation, and risk of contract repudiation (ICGR data are available from 1982 to 1995
for 105 developed and developing countries; BERI data are available from 1972 to 1995 for 55
developed and developing countries). Chong and Calderon (2000) ﬁnd a nonmonotonic rela-
tionship between institutional quality and income inequality. They show that for almost all
the developing countries in their sample, there is a positive relationship between institutional
quality and income inequality, while for most developed countries, it is a negative one. The
authors ﬁnd similar results for each institutional quality measure.
18Galor (2000) shows how in the early stage of economic development physical capital is
a prime engine for growth, while in the later stage of economic development human capital
accumulation becomes a prime engine for growth due to capital-skill complementarity. In this
paper I do not envisage physical capital, but it is worth noting that, in this framework, human
capital and technological progress are the prime engines for economic growth.
19Grigorian and Martinez (2001) maintain: ”the more a production process relies on suppli-
ers, sources of credit, and technological innovations, the more institutional-quality-intensive
the production process becomes.”
6derives the balanced growth properties of the economy. Section 4 draws the




Let households diﬀer in their uniformly distributed personal ability θ ∈ [0,1]
of their individual members to become skilled workers.20 All individuals have
identical intertemporally additively separable preferences for a mass of publicly
provided goods and services indexed by ˜ ω ∈ [0,β],w i t hβ ∈ (0,1),p r o d u c e db y
the private sector, and for an inﬁnite set of private goods and services indexed
by ω ∈ (β,1], and are endowed with a unit labor/study time endowment whose
supply generates no disutility.
Following Sarte (2001) I assume that the public sector supplies a given and
equal amount (1 − α)q˜ ω of each public good and service to consumer, where
(1 − α) indicates the fraction of product ˜ ω ∈ [0,β] acquired by the Government
and that is not wasted in overseeing rent-seeking bureaucracies.21 Therefore
each household does not solve its own maximization utility problem for the mass
of products provided by the public sector. The intertemporal and instantaneous
preferences are described as follows
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The consumption value of the public goods and services for an individual
with ability θ is deﬁned as
20As Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) all members of households θ h a v et h es a m ea b i l i t y
level equal to θ, and all households have the same number of members at each point in time.
21In this framework I assume that the Government acquires from monopolistic private ﬁrms
a given and equal quantity of product q˜ ω for each consumer. A fraction α of this quantity is
wasted in overseeing rent-seeking bureaucratic agencies. Therefore, each individual consume





























where N0 is the initial population of the economy and n is its constant
growth rate, ρ is the constant and common rate of subjective time preferences -
with ρ >n-a n dr(s) i st h em a r k e ti n t e r e s tr a t e .qθ (j,ω,s) is ability θ ∈ [0,1]
household’s per member quantity ﬂow of quality j ∈ {0,1,2,...} of good/service
ω ∈ (β,1] at time s ≥ 0 - p(j,ω,s) being the price of good ω of quality j
at time s - cθ (s) is the nominal expenditure. q(j, ˜ ω,s)(1− α) is the given
amount of public product ﬂow ˜ ω ∈ [0,β] at time s ≥ 0 of quality j ∈ {0,1,2,...}
provided to each household whichever is its ability θ ∈ [0,1] - p(j, ˜ ω,s) being
the price of good ˜ ω of quality j at time s. Wθ(t) and Zθ(t) are human and non-
human wealth levels, Tr are the public transfers representing the bureaucratic
rents. A new vintage of public good/service delivers λω > 1 more quality
services than its previous version.22 Diﬀerent versions of the same good ω are
regarded by consumers as perfect substitutes after adjusting for their quality
ratios, and jmax (ω,s) denotes the time s top quality of good ω (the same for the
industry lines ˜ ω ∈ [0,β]). I assume Bertrand competition at all dates between
the incumbent and the innovating ﬁrm as common in quality ladder models,
with the implication that in equilibrium only the top quality product will be
produced and acquired by the public sector in order to guarantee a given amount
of public services.
Individuals are ﬁnitely lived members of inﬁnitely lived households, being
continuously born at the constant rate β, and dying at the constant rate δ,w i t h
β − δ = n>0. D>0 denoting the exogenous given duration of their life.23
Each individual chooses to train and becomes skilled at the beginning of her
life (this choice is irreversible once done); the duration of her training period -
in which the individual cannot work - is exogenously ﬁxed at T<D .
22I assume heterogeneous quality jumps both between the existing industry lines and within
the same industry line. Usually j indicates both the quality level and the number of quality
jumps achieved in an industry line, when the quality jump is exogenous and constant (see
Grossman and Helpman, 1991). In such a case j also indicates the quality level of a product,
but - since the quality jumps are heterogeneous within an industry line - j summarizes both
the number of quality jumps and their diﬀerent size.
23As in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999), it is easy to show that the parameters above
must satisfy δ = n
enD−1 and β = nenD
enD−1, in order for the number of births at time t to match
the number of deaths at t + D.
8Hence an individual with ability θ decides to train if and only if the following










t r(τ) max(θ − γ,0)(1 − τ)wH (s)ds,
(2)
with 0 < γ < 1/2,a n dτ is the constant proportional tax rate levied on
workers. Notice that an individual with ability θ > γ is pustulatedly able to
accumulate human capital (θ − γ) after training, while an individual with ability
lower than γ (i.e. θ < γ) never gets any skill from schooling.
Like Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) I will focus on the steady state
analysis, in which all variables grow at a constant rate and wL,w H, and cθ
are all constant, furthermore r(s)=ρ at all dates.24 Considering (2) with
the equality the ability threshold θ0 is easily obtained which renders individual
indiﬀerent to becoming skilled or to remaining unskilled for all her life. Hence
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. An individual with ability θ > θ0
will decide to train and will accumulate quantity (θ − γ) of human capital. The
higher the individual ability, the higher the accumulated human capital and the
higher is the total amount of wages earned by the individual. Budget constraint
in (1) imply that an individual with higher ability will beneﬁtf r o mah i g h e r
value of consumption ﬂow.
Following the same steps as Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) it is easily









and that the supply of skilled labor at time t is











< 1. Along the steady state the growth
rate of both unskilled and skilled labor is equal to n. Notice that the propor-
tional tax does not aﬀect the individual choice to accumulate human capital
from schooling or to remain unskilled.
24Since we concentrate on the steady state analysis the results are also compatible with
the ﬁndings of Forbes (2000) which are valid in the short-medium term. Moreover, because
the existence of rent-seeking bureaucracies, and their strength and breadth, can vary between
countries and within the same country at diﬀerent times, the analysis is compatible with both
the cross-countries and within countries empirical analysis mentioned in the introduction.
92.2 Manufacture
The production of publicly provided goods and services is conducted by private
monopolistic ﬁrms which are protected by a perfectly enforceable patent law
for the production of their products. The Government provides institutional
protection for the innovation represented by an inﬁnitely lived patent granted
to the researcher who introduces a novel, useful, and non-obvious improvement
of any existing product. This allows the researcher to gain monopolistic rents for
all of the real duration of the patent, because - as usual in neo-Schumpeterian
growth models with vertical innovation (see e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1991,
and Aghion and Howitt, 1992-1998) - the incumbent monopolist can be replaced
by the next innovator in the same sector. Intellectual property rights spur the
innovation and the research eﬀort. The Government exerts a monopsonistic
p o w e ro v e ram a s sβ ∈ (0,1) of monopolistic ﬁrms by acquiring the product
at a price lower than the monopolistic limit price. This is done in order to
publicly provide goods and services reducing the ﬁscal burden on consumers
and therefore their expenditures for the acquisition of this mass of products.
Manufacturing ﬁrms hire unskilled workers to produce any consumption
good/service ˜ ω ∈ [0,β],a n dω ∈ (β,1] of the second-best quality under a one-
to-one constant returns to scale (CRS) technology, described by a simple unit
cost function wL.25 However, in each industry the top quality product can only
be manufactured by the ﬁrm that has discovered it - or by the ﬁrm that has
acquired the patent from the inventor - whose rights are protected by a perfectly
enforceable patent law.
A sm e n t i o n e da b o v e-i nt h en e o - S c h u m p e t e r i a ng r o w t hm o d e l sw i t hv e r t i c a l
innovation - the next quality of a given good or service is invented by the R&D
performed by challenger researchers in order to replace the incumbent producer
and gain monopolistic rents. During the temporary monopoly the patent holder
can sell her product at a price higher than the marginal cost, but the existence
of a competitive economy-wide frange sets a ceiling to it equal to the economy-
wide lowest unit cost of the previous quality product. For the mass of products
[1 − β) ∈ (0,1) the Government does not exert its monopsonistic power and
then the price p(jmax (ω,s),ω,s) of every top quality product is equal to λωwL,
where λω > 1 is the quality jump for the industry line ω ∈ [0,1].Ic h o o s et h e
unskilled labor wage as the numeraire of the economy, that is wL =1 .
Since there exist asymmetric quality jumps along the existing industry lines,
and since a mass β ∈ (0,1) of the existing goods and services are acquired by the
Government through rent-seeking bureaucratic agencies which know the quality
of the acquired product, each bureau could exert an asymmetric monopsonistic
power. Therefore the bureau acquiring the good ˜ ω ∈ [0,β] will pay a price (λ/ε)˜ ω
which is lower than the monopolistic limit market price. In fact ε ∈ [1,λ˜ ω)
indicates the monopsonistic power of the bureau supplying the product ˜ ω:w h e n
ε =1the bureau does not exert its monopsonistic power and buys the good ˜ ω
25It could be possible to introduce a technical coeﬃcient η > 0 common to all industries
without altering the qualitative results of the model. I prefer to adopt a one-to-one technology
as in Grossman and Helpman (1991) for the sake of simplicity.
10at the usual monopolistic limit market price λ˜ ωwL;w h e n ε = λ˜ ω the bureau
exerts its maximum monopsonistic power because it acquires the innovative
good/service at a price corresponding to the marginal cost wL, and hence does
not pay any premium for the quality jump. Since this does not give any proﬁtt o
the innovating ﬁrm there will be no innovation in the market when the bureau
exerts its maximum monopsonistic power, that is, there will be no incentive to
innovate. I do not envisage such a case because I am interested in endogenous
growth models with technological improvements on the existing goods/services.
The publicly provided goods and services allow the consumers to pay a price
lower than the quality adjusted price that they would pay for the same privately
provided goods.
Since the quantity produced q˜ ω is given by the Government choice and it is
common to all industries, the quantity of the product ˜ ω consumed is
Q˜ ω ≡ N (t)(1− α)
Z 1
0
q˜ ωdθ ≡ (1 − α)q˜ ωN (t) (6)
Notice that only a fraction (1 − α),w i t hα ∈ (0,1),o fe a c hp r o d u c t˜ ω is
consumed by individuals. In fact, a fraction α of each ﬁnal good and service is
used by the Government to ﬁnance the overseeing activity on bureaus. Therefore
the total quantity of each industry line ˜ ω acquired by the Government is
Q˜ ω ≡ (1 − α)q˜ ωN (t)+αq˜ ωN (t)=q˜ ωN (t) (7)
The asymmetric monopsonistic power among bureaus implies that the eﬀec-
tive price paid to manufacturing ﬁrm producing good ˜ ω ∈ [0,β] is (λ/ε)˜ ω;i t
follows that the stream of monopoly proﬁts accruing to the ˜ ω’s state-of-the-art


















Am a s s[1−β) ∈ (0,1) of the existing industry lines is directly sold by monop-
olistic ﬁrms to households. In light of the instantaneous household preferences
I can boil down the consumer θ demand quantity for each product ω ∈ (β,1] as
qω ≡ N (t)
Z 1
0
cθ − (1 − α)qΛ˜ ω
(1 − β)λω
dθ = N (t)
c − (1 − α)qΛ˜ ω
(1 − β)λω
(9)
where c indicates the per-capita consumption fraction of product ω, q is





˜ ω d˜ ω. In equilibrium the above quantity coincide with the production of
every consumption good by the ﬁrm that monopolizes it. It follows that the
stream of monopoly proﬁt ﬂows accruing to the monopolist which manufactures
the state-of-the-art quality product ω will be equal to:
π(ω,s)=qω [λω − 1] = N (t)









In a vertical R&D framework in each industry the incumbent producer is chal-
lenged by outsider R&D ﬁrms that employ skilled workers in order to introduce
better versions of the existing goods and services. As usual in quality ladder
models à la Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998)
Arrow’s eﬀect is at work. Each incumbent monopolist has no informational ad-
vantage over the outsider ﬁrms; hence it has no incentive to perform R&D in its
own sector because it destroys its own monopolistic rents reducing its innovation
value with respect to that of any other outsider ﬁrm. Therefore the monopo-
list does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to undertake any R&D at the equilibrium wage.
I n s t e a de a c ho u t s i d e rﬁrm has the incentive to perform R&D in any existing
industry lines.
Every R&D ﬁrm i can produce an instantaneous Poisson arrival rate of inno-
vation Ii (ω,s) in the product line ω ∈ (β,1] it targets using a CRS technology
d e s c r i b e db yu n i tc o s tf u n c t i o nbwH X (ω,s),w i t hb>0 common to all indus-
tries, and X (ω,s) > 0 measuring the degree of complexity in the invention of
the next quality product in industry ω ∈ (β,1].F o r t h e R & D ﬁrms targeting
the industry lines ˜ ω ∈ [0,β] over which the Government exerts its monopsonistic
power, the instantaneous Poisson arrival rate of innovation is Ii (˜ ω,s),a n dt h e
degree of complexity in the invention of the next quality product is X (˜ ω,s) > 0.
I assume that the returns to R&D investment are indipendently distributed
across ﬁrms, across industries, and over time. Therefore the industry-wide ar-
rival rate of innovation in industry ω at time s is I (ω,s)=
P
i Ii (ω,s)dω,w h i c h
represents the aggregate summation of the Poisson arrival rate of innovation pro-
duced by all R&D ﬁrms targeting product ω ∈ (β,1], while the industry-wide
arrival rate of innovation in industry ˜ ω at time s is I (˜ ω,s)=
P
i Ii (˜ ω,s)d˜ ω,
which represents the aggregate summation of the Poisson arrival rate of inno-
vation produced by all R&D ﬁrms targeting product ˜ ω ∈ [0,β].
The Poisson speciﬁcation of the innovation process implies the independence
of the individual instantaneous arrival rate of the innovation. Each individual
contribution to R&D by each skilled worker gives an independent contribution
to the aggregate instantaneous probability of innovation. There does not exist
any externality among researchers in the individual productivity even though
there exists reciprocal collaboration at the idea-creation moment.26
The technological complexity argument as indexed by factor X (ω,s) was in-
troduced into R&D-based endogenous growth models after Charles Jones’ (1995
a,b) empirical criticism of the ﬁrst strand of neo-Schumpeterian endogenous
growth models, which showed scale eﬀects on per-capita output growth rate.27
26Each researcher beneﬁts from the whole knowledge accumulated in an industry, but the
’parallel’ interaction between two or more researchers working in the same ﬁrm in order to
introduce the next innovation does not alter their individual productivity. This implies that
R&D productivity is the same if each research worker undertakes R&D by employing herself
as if they are working together in the same ﬁrm.
27The ﬁrst strand of Schumpeterian endogenous growth models (Romer, 1990; Grossman
and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992) showed the per-capita output growth rate
as dependent on the level of resources or labor engaged in research activity. Therefore an
12I follow one of the two alternative laws of motion of the technological complexity
index, that is, the PEG28 speciﬁcation suggested by Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
(1999)
X (ω,s)=X (˜ ω,s)=kN (t) (11)
with k>0, thereby formalizing the idea that it is more diﬃcult to introduce
a new product in a more crowded market. In the present framework with qual-
ity improving consumer goods and services, the per-capita growth rate of the
economy is represented by the increase over time of the representative consumer
utility level.
Let v(˜ ω,s) denotes the expected discounted proﬁts of a successful ﬁrm in
industry ˜ ω at time s. Because each leader is targeted by R&D ﬁrms that try to
discover the next quality leader product, the shareholder suﬀers a loss v(˜ ω,s)
with probability I (˜ ω,s)ds. Whereas the event of no innovation occurs with
probability [1 − I (˜ ω,s)]ds.O v e rat i m ei n t e r v a lds, the shareholder of a stock
issued by a successful R&D ﬁrm receives a dividend π (˜ ω,s)ds and the value of
the ﬁrm appreciates by dv (˜ ω,s)=˙ v(˜ ω,s)ds. Since the stock market is assumed
perfectly eﬃcient, the expected rate of return of a stock issued by a successful




[1 − I (˜ ω,s)ds]ds −
v (˜ ω,s) − 0
v (˜ ω,s)




Taking the limits as ds → 0, I obtain the following condition for the expected
discounted value of the ﬁrm producing good ˜ ω
v(˜ ω,s)=
π(˜ ω,s)









˜ ω − 1
¤





where I have posed r = ρ since I analyze the balanced growth path. The
same argument applies for all industry lines ω ∈ (β,1]. Hence a ﬁrm producing
increase in the level of research eﬀort would raise the per-capita output growth rate of the
economy. Jones (1995 a,b) showed that, since the 50’s, the labor force engaged in research
activity raised in several OECD countries but - in the same period for the same countries -
the per-capita output growth rate remained constant or declined on average. Therefore the
scale eﬀect predicted by the ﬁrst strand of Schumpeterian endogenous growth models is at
odds with this empirical evidence.
28The acronym ”PEG” refers to the ”permanent eﬀects on growth” of policy measures such
as R&D direct subsidies and tariﬀs: these measures can alter the steady state per-capita
growth rate of the economy. This is distinguished by the law of motion for technological
complexity deﬁned as ”TEG”, which produces ”temporary eﬀects on growth” of policy mea-
sures such as R&D direct subsidies and tariﬀs: these measures cannot alter the steady state
per-capita growth rate of the economy, which is pinned down by the population growth rate,
by a negative externality, and by the number of countries where R&D is active.
13good ω has an expected discounted value that satisﬁed the following
v(ω,s)=
π(ω,s)





qω [λω − 1]





As in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) in the steady state the per-capita












π(˜ ω,s) = n. Hence the discounted expected proﬁt values (13) and (12)
boil down respectively to
v (ω,s)=
qω [λω − 1]








˜ ω − 1
¤
ρ + I (˜ ω,s) − n
(15)
Each R&D ﬁrm targeting product ω ∈ (β,1] and ˜ ω ∈ [0,β] chooses its R&D
intensity to maximize respectively v(ω,s)Ii (ω,s) − bX (ω,s)wHIi (ω,s),a n d
v (˜ ω,s)Ii (˜ ω,s) − bX (˜ ω,s)wHIi (˜ ω,s). The R&D sector is characterized by a
perfectly competitive environment, with free entry and exit and CRS technology.
This implies that for all industries ω ∈ (β,1] and ˜ ω ∈ [0,β] targeted by positive
R&D the following no-arbitrage conditions respectively hold
v(ω,s)=
qω [λω − 1]
ρ + I (ω,s) − n
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¤
ρ + I (˜ ω,s) − n
= bX (˜ ω,s)wH (17)
Since each bureau exerts a diﬀerent monopsonistic power over the private
ﬁrm from which acquires the product, there will exist an innovation Poisson
arrival rate structure in the economy, where the Poisson arrival rate I (ω,s)
and I (˜ ω,s) will be higher for the industry lines which sell their product at a
higher price. The no-arbitrage equations (16) and (17) imply that the Poisson
arrival rate targeting the industry lines with higher price, and hence gaining
higher proﬁts, will have a correspondingly higher Poisson arrival rate. In fact
higher proﬁt ﬂows in an industry spur more innovative eﬀo r ti ni tu n t i lt h e
higher increasing creative destruction exactly oﬀsets the higher rents in the
same industry. This process will continue and in equilibrium the equations
(16) and (17) will be satisﬁed for each industry line ω ∈ (β,1],a n d˜ ω ∈ [0,β]
respectively.
142.4 Public Sector
The public sector supplies a continuum of public goods and services indexed by
˜ ω ∈ [0,β] subject to vertical technological innovation à la Grossman and Help-
man (1991, ch.4). The goods/services are acquired from privately producing
ﬁr m st h a n k st ot a xp r o c e e d sl e v i e do nc o n s u m e r s .
As usual in neo-Schumpeterian growth models where there exists vertical
innovation over a continuum of goods and where the innovations are no-drastic,
each monopolistic producer will charge a limit price corresponding to the quality
jump λ˜ ω > 1 over the marginal cost of production. I assume that the Govern-
ment will exert its monopsonistic power over the private ﬁrms producing the
existing products, thus it reduces the price at which the goods are acquired.
This is done because it allows to supply public goods and services with a lower
tax level for each consumer. Since the Government has not full information
about the technological level and innovations in each of the existing sector,
the goods and services are acquired through bureaus that possess the techni-
cal information about the product they buy. Therefore, for each good/service,
the Government exerts a monopsonistic power through the rent-seeking bureau-
cratic agency acquiring the product. The monopsonistic power is measured by
the parameter ε ∈ [1,λ˜ ω)29 which allows the Government to reduce the price
paid to each private monopolistic ﬁrm. In fact, given the quality jump λ˜ ω > 1,
the eﬀective price paid by the bureau acquiring the product ˜ ω is (λ/ε)˜ ω.
Like Sarte (2001), the discussion focuses on how to eﬃciently allocate public
expenditures across bureaus, hence I do not envisage the ﬁscal policy set-up.
Since bureaus act to maximize their discretionary budget, the monitoring agen-
cies of bureaus serve to economize on total Government outlays. The budget
allocation process is assumed to occur through an oversight agency which takes
policy as given. As remarked by Sarte (2001) ”in the US, the task of bureau
oversight, including budget review and allocation, is largely carried out by The
Oﬃce of Management and Budget. As such the Oﬃce of Management and
Budget does not decide on policy per se, which is typically decided in Congress,
but rather helps the executive branch of Government with respect to managing
public expenditures.”
The supply of each ﬁnal public good and service is associated with a particu-
lar bureau; furthermore, as mentioned above, each bureau is required to acquire
a given and common level of good/service Q˜ ω = Q, ∀˜ ω,f o rw h i c hi tr e q u e s t s
a corresponding budget from the Government. Since the per-capita quantity of
public products is constant over time, and since there exists perfect symmetry
between the existing industry lines β - i.e. for each industry line the interval in
which the quality jumps can vary is the same - I deﬁne µ˜ ω ≡ [(λ/ε)˜ ω − 1] as the
per-unit proﬁt ﬂow for the industry line ˜ ω ∈ [0,β].
I assume, like Sarte (2001), that µ˜ ω is a random variable with support
29Notice that the upper bound of the interval, i.e. the value λ˜ ω,i se x c l u d e db yt h es e t .
This is because given quality jump λ˜ ω > 1, when the monopsonistic power destroys all the
monopolistic rents of private ﬁrms, the incentive to innovate disappears, as said above.
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30 which is distributed according to the continuously diﬀerentiable
probability density function f (µ˜ ω;z), with the corresponding cumulative dis-
tribution F (µ˜ ω;z). Hence the proﬁt ﬂows of the innovation - and then the
costs associated with the provision of Government services - are themselves ran-
dom. All bureaus draw from the distribution f (µ˜ ω;z), z orders distributions
by ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance.31 While the distribution F (µ˜ ω;z) is pub-
licly known, only the bureaus have full information about technological quality
of their supplied goods/services; the realization of µ˜ ω - and hence the quality
of each product - is only costless observable by the bureau which supplies the
product ˜ ω.
Since the oversight agency has the aim of monitoring the bureaus which pos-
sess an informational advantage, the oversight agency requires skills in order to
better understand the eﬀectiveness of the bureaus’ endeavours. The monitor-
ing activity of the Government requires αwHQ,w i t hα ∈ (0,1), units of ﬁnal
product expressed in units of skilled workers in order to observe the bureau’s
realization of µ˜ ω when bureau output is Q˜ ω = Q, ∀˜ ω ∈ [0,β]. Hence αwHQ
represents the oversight cost for each bureau.32 Since each bureau is required
to acquire a common level of public good it follows that
Z λ−1
0
βQµ˜ ωdF (µ˜ ω;z)=βQµm (z) (18)
Following Sarte (2001) - and having postulated an informational advantage
of each bureau on the technological quality of the acquired product - that is
the bureaucratic agent knows the true quality jump, and quality, of the product
- I model the budget allocation process as a static optimal contract between
each bureau and the oversight agency, which serves to economize on public
expenditures. The static process relative to the public sector repeats in each
instant: it is like having discrete time with duration of each interval tending to
zero.
In a world where monitoring never takes place, bureaus will always announce
µ˜ ω = λ˜ ω − 1 and require the maximum budget. I therefore deﬁne the optimal
budget allocation mechanism as one which minimizes total Government expen-
ditures while ensuring that the budget allocated to bureaus at least covers the
costs to acquire the products. Moreover, I require that each bureau’s budget
30The support is
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respectively when ε → λ˜ ω for any ˜ ω ∈ [0,β],a n dw h e nε =1 ,
where ¯ λ is the upper bound of the quality jumps which is common for all the industry lines.
31Formally
∂F(µ˜ ω;z)
∂z < 0,f o r0 <z≤ 1.A n i n c r e a s e i n z, therefore, generally renders
per-unit provision of Government goods and services more costly by shifting the distribution
in a ﬁrst-order sense.
32Notice that a higher price can also reﬂe c tc o r r u p t i o no ft h eo v e r s i g h ta g e n c i e s . I nf a c t ,
monitoring agencies can be corrupted in order to reducing monitoring eﬀectiveness of rent-
seeking and corrupt bureaus. This can be done by rebating back to monitoring agencies a
fraction of the higher price paid to manufacturing ﬁrm selling product to the Government.
This phenomena is not explicitly inserted in the model.
16request correspond to its true realization of µ˜ ω.33 In other words, the contract
must satisfy incentive compatibility. Since only the bureau knows the true real-
ization of µ˜ ω, the Government does not know the degree of monopsonistic power
exerted by the bureau. In this environment it is optimal for the Government to
monitor institution to allocate to each bureau ¯ µ, measured in units of output,





[µ˜ ωβQ + αwHβQ]dF (µ˜ ω;z)+βQ¯ µF (¯ µ;z) (19)
The threshold ¯ µ minimizes total Government spending while ensuring that
bureaus obtain a budget that covers the cost of acquiring the goods; moreover
the contract is such that bureaus report the truth. Bureaus that exert a low level
of monopsonistic power over the private manufacturing ﬁrms, and hence have a
higher price, obtain a relatively large budget in the amount of µ˜ ωQ. However,
these bureaus are also subject to oversight by the political agency.34 Bureaus
that exert a high degree of monopsonistic power - and therefore that report a
relatively low value of µ˜ ω - are not monitored and allocate a ﬂat budget, ¯ µQ,i n
excess of the true proﬁt ﬂow guaranteed to the private ﬁrm, µ˜ ωQ,w i t hµ˜ ω < ¯ µ.
Since the oversight agency can not discriminate between bureaus that are not
monitored, assigning a ﬂat budget across these bureaus ensures that incentive
compatibility holds in that region. Therefore the bureaus which exert a high
level of monopsonistic power over the private manufacturing ﬁrms - and therefore
over the researchers who introduce an innovative good along a product line -
obtain a discretionary surplus in the amount of Q(¯ µ − µ˜ ω), that is, the bureaus
appropriate a part of the innovation value. To the degree that the allocation
of budgets allows for informational rents to be earned by the bureaucracy, I
assume these rents to be rebated back to households as a lump-sum transfer.35
The solution to the minimization problem above is (see Appendix A):
33As in Sarte (2001) the lexicographic preferences of each bureau - where the ﬁrst place in
the utility is occupied by the bureau maintainment while the second priority is the budget
maximization - are implicitly assumed.
34The static optimal contract between each bureau and the oversight agency could generate
some form of distortion. In fact, suppose that quality jumps across industry lines are very
heterogeneous. Then the bureau acquiring a product from an industry line which has a high
quality jump could be monitored even if the bureau exerted a high level of monopsonistic power
because µ˜ ω > ¯ µ, due to the high quality jump in industry ˜ ω. Instead, the bureau acquiring a
product from an industry line which has a low quality jump would not be monitored even if
the bureau exerted a low level of monopsonistic power because µ˜ ω < ¯ µ due to the low quality
jump. This can also happen in the same industry line because of the heterogeneous quality
jumps in each instant of time for each product ˜ ω ∈ [0,β].
35I assume lump-sum transfers. The analysis is conducted supposing that bureaus’ discre-
tionary rents are entirely consumed before being subject to taxation. Such hidden consump-
tion may take the form of public perks. In the opposite case in which the lump-sum transfers
are subject to taxation - i.e. are considered in the equation (2) - an increase in transfers,
when oversight costs rise, tends to raise ability threshold θ0 reinforcing the results of the
model. While if the transfers decrease as oversight costs rise - and hence there exists a strong
reduction of the produced quantity of goods and services and hence of θ0 -t h i sw i l lt e n dt o
reduce the threshold ability mitigating the results of the model.
17F (¯ µ∗;z)=αwHf (¯ µ∗;z) (20)
The solution to the minimization problem indicates the existence of two
opposite forces at work. On the one hand, a higher value of threshold ¯ µ in-
dicates that a smaller fraction of the bureaucracy will be monitored. This in
turn reduces the quantity of ﬁnal goods and services used in the oversight of the
bureaus. On the other hand, a higher monitoring threshold also means that bu-
reaucratic informational rents rise. The result in equation (20) is quite intuitive,
the LHS represents the marginal gain from decreasing a bureau’s informational
rents, which oﬀsets the additional increase in oversight resources as represented
by the RHS. It is obvious that the solution depends on both the diﬃculty of
monitoring, as summarized by α, and the distribution that characterizes the
cost of providing Government services, as summarized by z.
By considering equation (19) I am able to determine the equilibrium level of



























I have to envisage that a part of this per-worker proportional tax is rebated
back to consumers as lump-sum transfers for the total amount of discretional
bureaucratic informational rents.36
3 Balanced Growth Path
Given the economic environment described in section 2, I analyze the gen-
eral equilibrium implications of the economy. Like Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
(1999) I focus on the steady state properties of the model.
Since each ﬁnal good monopolist employs unskilled labor economy-wide to









c − (1 − α)qΛ˜ ω
(1 − β)λω
dω. (22)
which can be rewritten as
N (t)θ0 = N (t)βq +
N (t)Λω
(1 − β)
[c − (1 − α)qΛ˜ ω] (23)
36Notice that, although lump-sum transfers are not taxed, a higher value of these transfers
determines a higher value of the proportional tax rate.




From (23) I obtain the per-capita consumption fraction
c =( θ0 − βq)
(1 − β)
Λω
+( 1− α)qΛ˜ ω (24)
Notice that mere existence of Government monitoring costs on bureaus (i.e.
α ∈ (0,1)) - and therefore the existence of rent-seeking bureaucratic agents with
an informational advantage over the Government - negatively aﬀects consump-
tion.
Substituting equation (24) into (9), it is possible to write the quantity of




[θ0 − βq] (25)
which assumes positive value if and only if θ0 > βq. From now onward I
assume that this condition holds.37
Considering equations (16) and (25), it is possible to write down the quantity
for each good/service as
N (t)
Λωλω
[θ0 − βq]=bX (ω,s)wH
ρ + I (ω,s) − n
[λω − 1]
, (26)
which - since wH = σ






ρ + I (ω,s) − n
[λω − 1]
, (27)











− (ρ − n) (28)
In the same way, considering equation (17) it is possible to write down the
no-arbitrage equation for each publicly provided good/service as
N (t)q = bX (˜ ω,s)wH
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which - since wH = σ
θ0−γ and X (˜ ω,s)/N (t)=k -c a nb er e w r i t t e na s
37If condition θ0 > βq does not hold there will survive only monopolistic ﬁrms selling their
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− (ρ − n). (31)
As for unskilled labor, it is possible to boil down the market clearing equi-
librium condition for the skilled labor force. Using equation (5) and the CRS
technology production function of innovating ﬁrms, the skilled labor market
equilibrium condition is













where X (˜ ω,s)/N (t) ≡ x˜ ω = xω ≡ X (ω,s)/N (t)=k. In eq.(32) I have
envisaged both the skilled labor force directly engaged in the research activity
on the existing goods and services, and the skilled resources engaged in the
monitoring activity as expressed by a fraction of ﬁnal goods and services publicly
provided.
Considering the PEG formulation of the increasing technological complexity
it immediately follows that the population adjusted diﬃc u l t yi n d e xi sa l w a y s
equal to the constant k. Therefore it is possible to rewrite equation (32) as



















. Then, considering equations
(28), (31), and (33), it is possible to derive the following
Proposition 1 Under PEG speciﬁcation, if the public sector acquires a quan-
tity of public goods and services suﬃciently low, a steady state exists for every
distribution of µ˜ ω ∈
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¤
satisfying (A3) such that θ0 > γ.A tt h es t e a d y
state, θ0 is a decreasing function of α.
Proof. See Appendix B
Along the balanced growth path, any increase in oversight costs - as repre-
sented by an increase of parameter α ∈ (0,1) - spurs skill acquisition by a larger
fraction of the population. This happens because of the increased demand for
skill resources from the public sector, which must limit the informational gap
between the political authority and the rent-seeking bureaucratic agencies.
204C o s t l y O v e r s i g h t : e ﬀects on economies
As remarked by Sarte (2001) and Ayal and Karras (1996), the institutional set-
ting of Government bureaus diﬀers widely across economies. At the same time,
as indicated in the introduction, one notices the existence of a negative rela-
tionship between rent-seeking bureaucracies and the per-capita output growth
rate of the economy. I now envisage the possibility that these observations may
endogenously arise in an economy where the political authority ﬁnds it diﬃcult
to oversee its bureaucracy.
In order to show how more Government costly oversight activity aﬀects the
economic performance of a country I envisage proposition 1. The existence of
a negative relationship between oversight diﬃculty parameter α and threshold
ability θ0 implies that more costly oversight - as represented by an increase
of the parameter α - reduces the threshold ability above which the individual
will decide to acquire skills. At the same time it reduces the fraction - and
hence the absolute number - of the unskilled labor force living at time t.T h i s
immediately determines a reduction in the total quantity of goods and services
that can be produced with the existing unskilled labor force. Although the
fraction of population which decides to acquire skills has raised because of the
reduction of threshold ability θ0, the aggregate rate of innovation of the economy
decreases.
In order to show these results I consider equation (17) - for the industry lines
over which the Government exerts its monopsonistic power - and equations (16)
and (25), for the monopolistic private sector that directly sells the products to
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ρ + I (ω,s) − n
= bkwH (35)
where equation (35) is obtained by sobstituting equation (25) into equation
(16).
The decrease of threshold ability θ0 raises skilled wage wH and therefore
raises the skill premium and income inequality (see equation 3). In fact, even
if a larger fraction of population decides to accumulate human capital through
schooling, the increase of the skill resources spent on oversight produces a pos-
itive demand excess in the skill labor market raising the skill premium. Since
skilled wage wH rises, the costs of innovation activity rise as well.
Considering equation (35), and since ∂θ0
∂α < 0, it is easily showed that the
proﬁt ﬂows of private ﬁrms selling their products directly to consumers de-
creases. The costs of innovation activity outweigh the proﬁt ﬂows of the man-
ufacturing ﬁrm producing variety ω ∈ (β,1], and so research activity is no
21longer proﬁtable. This in turn reduces the innovation eﬀort in each industry
line ω ∈ (β,1]. The aggregate Poisson arrival rate targeting product ω will de-
crease until the innovative eﬀort becomes proﬁtable. This process will continue
until - along the balanced growth path - the no-arbitrage equation (35) will be
satisﬁed. Since this argument applies for all industry lines ω ∈ (β,1], the aggre-
gate private innovation rate decreases.38 In the same way considering equation
(34) it is easy to show that the proﬁt ﬂows for each ndustry line ˜ ω ∈ [0,β] remain
constants. In fact, the Government acquires the same ﬁxed per-capita quantity
q for all industry lines ˜ ω. Therefore the costs of innovation activity - and hence
of acquisition of the patent - outweigh the proﬁt ﬂows of the manufacturing ﬁrm
producing product ˜ ω, and so research activity is no longer proﬁtable. This in
turn reduces the innovation eﬀort in each of the industry lines ˜ ω ∈ [0,β] and
therefore reduces the aggregate Poisson arrival rate targeting product ˜ ω until -
along the balanced growth path - the no-arbitrage equation (34) will be satis-
ﬁed. Since this argument applies for all industry lines ˜ ω ∈ [0,β], the aggregate
public innovation rate decreases.
Hence, as more and more skill resources are spent on oversight, the increase in
population fraction deciding to acquire skills is not suﬃcient to generate a higher
per-capita output growth rate. Furthermore, the decrease in ability threshold
above which individuals decide to acquire skills determines an increase in skill
premium widening wage inequality. In last, any increase in the oversight cost α
reduces the consumption of any existing product.
Therefore I can state the following
Proposition 2 An increase in the oversight diﬃculty as represented by the in-
crease in parameter α ∈ (0,1) determines: 1) an increase in the skill premium
and therefore determines higher wage inequality; 2) a decrease in the industry-
wide and in the aggregate rate of innovation, and thus a reduction in the per-
capita output growth rate of the economy. Furthermore, an increase in the over-
sight cost spurs human capital accumulation, and it reduces the consumption of
each existing good and service.
H e n c ea n yi n c r e a s ei nt h eo v e r s i g h td i ﬃc u l t y ,a n dt h e na n yr e d u c t i o ni n
the transparency of the public sector - as represented by an increase in the
parameter α ∈ (0,1) - depresses the innovative eﬀort of the economy, and then
the per-capita output growth rate.
Along the balanced growth path there exists a negative relationship between
inequality and growth. As the public sector transparency better oﬀ,al o w e r
fraction of the existing skill resources are wasted for monitoring activity. Despite
the fraction of population that decides to acquire skills decreases, the research
costs reduce. This in turn spurs the industry-wide and the aggregate innovation
38For the sake of simplicity I refer to the fraction of sectors β ∈ (0,1), which products are
acquired by the government, as public goods and services, and then I refer to the Poisson
arrival rate I (˜ ω,s) as public innovation rate, and to the Poisson arrival rate I (ω,s) as private
innovation rate. This deﬁnition is made to simplify exposition. In such an economy the
research eﬀort and the costs for innovation is conducted by private ﬁrms and/or individuals.
22eﬀort, and then the per-capita output growth rate. Moreover the wage inequality
between skilled and unskilled labor is reduced.
Moreover, the increase in the oversight diﬃculty determines an increase in
threshold unit proﬁt ﬂow ¯ µ∗,b u tt h ee ﬀect on the public expenditures - and
hence on the tax levied on consumers - remains not univocally determined.
In fact, by using equation (A2), the eﬀect of a higher oversight diﬃculty on









which is strictly positive because I have assumed equation (A1) to be a
strictly convex function of ¯ µ.
An upwards shift in the monitoring costs naturally leads to less oversight,
that is a lower number of bureaus will be monitored.
Moreover, since
R ¯ µ∗
0 (¯ µ∗ − µ)dF (µ;z) is strictly increasing in ¯ µ∗,ah i g h e r
monitoring cost directly leads to raising of the total quantity of discretionary
surplus accruing to the bureaucracy for a given level of product q.T h ee ﬀect
on total public expenditures, and hence on tax levied on consumers is, however,
ambiguous. In fact, considering equations (A5), (A6), and (B3) the increase in
the oversight cost determines opposite eﬀects on diﬀerent variables. Therefore
more costly oversight produces a depressive eﬀect on the economy, reducing
the quantity of the existing goods and services consumed, but not necessarily
determining higher levels of public expenditures level and therefore a higher
ﬁscal burden on consumers.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Several empirical works show that institutional quality - in the form of bureau-
cratic quality - positively aﬀects the growth performance of both developed
and developing countries. Moreover, an important contribution by Chong and
Calderon (2000) shows that, in developed countries, lack of bureaucratic quality
contribute to widening income inequality.
In this paper I envisage the interactions of rent-seeking bureaucratic agencies
with both the public authority and the private market. I show that bureaucratic
quality encompasses both rent-seeking and corruption phenomena in bureaus,
and that corruption plays a role through lack bureaucratic quality. The Gov-
ernment has to limit the informational gap with respect to its bureaus, using
a monitoring agency which requires skill resources in order to oversee the rent-
seeking bureaucratic agents. Moreover the Government exerts its monopsonis-
tic power - through its bureaucratic agencies - over the private producing ﬁrms
which manufacture goods and services subject to technological improvement
conducted by private researchers.
23I show that in such an economic environment more costly oversight - as
represented by a larger amount of skill resources spent on oversight - widens
income inequality and negatively aﬀects the aggregate rate of innovation, and
hence the per-capita output growth rate of the economy. This happens because -
as the oversight diﬃculty increases - more and more skill resources are absorbed
by the public sector in order to monitor the bureaus, so increasingly fewer skill
resources can be employed in research activity. This reduces the per-sector and
the aggregate rate of innovation although a larger fraction of population will
have been stimulated to accumulate skills by an increase in the skills demand
and in the skill premium. Finally, there exists an uncertain eﬀect of more costly
oversight on the public budget and expenditures. In fact, I have shown that the
eﬀect on tax burden and transfers are not univocally determined.
This theoretical analysis matches well the data for developed countries in
which the fundamental engines of economic growth are technological progress
and human capital accumulation. This means that lack of bureaucratic qual-
ity widens income inequality and reduces the per-capita output growth rate
because it contributes to diverting skill resources from productive activities to-
ward unproductive ones. This does not mean that the same causal mechanism
is not at work in developing countries, it may well be. However, in less devel-
oped countries R&D and human capital accumulation are not as advanced as
in developed countries, and so the adverse eﬀect of lack institutional quality on
growth performance probably operates through other channels than the waste
of skill resources, or at least this channel is not as important as it is in developed
countries. Moreover, since in developing countries human capital accumulation
and technological progress are not as diﬀuse and advanced as in developed coun-
tries, it is more diﬃcult for income inequality to be proxied by the skill premium
in developing countries.
24Appendix A
In the ﬁrst part of Appendix A I calculate the per-unit proﬁt ﬂow opti-
mal threshold ¯ µ∗. Following the same steps as Sarte (2001) the minimization
problem in equation (19) can be rewritten as:
βQµm (z)+αwHβQ[1 − F (¯ µ;z)] +
Z ¯ µ
0
βQ(¯ µ − µ˜ ω)dF (µ˜ ω;z) (A1)
In this equation the ﬁrst two terms measure the value of public goods and
services used in the acquisition and monitoring respectively. The third term
represents the total discretionary surplus accruing to bureaus, measured as a
fraction of the total proﬁt ﬂows earned by the incumbent ﬁrms. Using Leibniz’s
rule, the solution to the problem above is
βQF (¯ µ;z) − αwHβQf (¯ µ;z)=0 . (A2)
I assume that the second-order condition for a minimization problem is sat-
isﬁed, equation (A1) is strictly convex in ¯ µ,t h a ti s




It directly follows that the solution to the minimization problem in (19)
solves
F (¯ µ∗;z)=αwHf (¯ µ∗;z) (A4)
The ﬁrst-order condition (A2) determines optimal threshold ¯ µ∗.
Q.E.D.
In this part of Appendix A I determine the equilibrium level of per-worker
proportional tax τ. Notice that because of the constant term in µ˜ ω and ¯ µ,I
can rewrite equation (19) by considering prices. Hence by considering equation































The equilibrium balanced public budget univocally determines the equilib-





























In this appendix I show the conditions for a steady-state solution for the
ability threshold θ0 ∈ (γ,1), and I prove the existence of a negative relation
between threshold ability θ0 and oversight cost α.
Under PEG speciﬁcation of R&D diﬃculty the economywide Poisson arrival











(θ0 − γ)(θ0 − βq)
σbkΛω
(1 − β − Λω)+
q(θ0 − γ)
σbk
(Λ˜ ω − β) − bk(ρ − n) (B1)
where the terms (1 − β − Λω),a n d(Λ˜ ω − β) are strictly positive since they














˜ ω − 1
¤
d˜ ω.
Therefore I can write equation (33) as:




(θ0 − γ)(θ0 − βq)
Λωσ
(1 − β − Λω)+
+
q (θ0 − γ)
σ
(Λ˜ ω − β) − bk(ρ − n)+αβq(B2)
The LHS of equation (B2) is a strictly concave quadratic polynomial with
roots (2γ − 1) and 1.M o r e o v e r ,b yp o s i n gq =0 ,t h eR H So fe q u a t i o n( B 2 )i sa
strictly convex quadratic polynomial with two real roots, one negative and one












if the stated parameter restrictions are satisﬁed, where a ≡
(1−β−Λω)
Λωσ .T h e r e -
fore because of continuity of the functions I conclude that - whenever the Gov-
ernment acquires a suﬃciently low quantity of each product ˜ ω , there exists one,
and only one, real and positive steady state solution θ0 ∈ (γ,1).
Using the Implicit Function Theorem for equation (B2) I am able to prove





(θ0 − γ)φ +( 2 θ0 − γ − βq)a +
q
σ (Λ˜ ω − β)
< 0 (B3)
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